Projects/Audit
Contents
Purpose
Create an Audit infrastructure within MIT Kerberos to monitor security related events on the KDC. In future expand Kerberos Audit facility to the application servers, kadmin if it remains desirable.
Requirements
The new audit system should be:
- build-time enabled;
- run-time pluggable;
- simple, so it could be easily replaced with the OS specific implementations;
Events
This section details the categories of the auditable events and the associated information.
Audit module loaded/unloaded
- Startup and shutdown of the audit system must be recorded by audit system;
KDC started/stopped
- Startup and shutdown of the KDC must be recorded by audit system;
Authentication
(Common Criteria Class FIA)
We anticipate that in some cases the multiple levels of details of the audit output will be needed. We suggest having two levels: Detailed and its subset, Basic.
AS exchange
Basic level
- TGT ticket ID (on success);
- request ID;
- client’s address and port;
- enctype of session key;
- enctype of reply-encrypting key - client principal's key;
- KDC request:
- requested service principal;
- client’s principal;
Detailed level
- KDC status message (on failure);
- KDC request:
- KDC options;
- requested ticket start, end and renew_till times;
- list of requested addresses;
- requested enctypes;
- preauth types (on failure);
- KDC reply:
- TGT ticket (on success);
- preauth types (on failure).
TGS exchange
Basic level
- TGT ticket ID - primary ticket ID;
- service or referral TGT ticket ID (on success) - derived ticket ID;
- request ID;
- client’s address and port;
- enctype of session key;
- enctype of long-term key of the service;
- enctype of reply-encrypting key;
- was ticket renewed;
- was ticket validated;
- KDC request:
- requested service principal;
- client’s principal;
- KDC reply:
- service ticket (on success);;
Detailed level
- KDC status message (on failure);
- KDC request:
- KDC options;
- requested ticket start, end and renew_till times;
- list of requested addresses;
- requested enctypes;
- KDC reply:
- preauth types (on failure);
- referral TGT ticket (on success).
TGS Extensions
S4U2self
- entry-point-server's TGT ticket ID - primary ticket ID;
- request ID;
- On error:
- user's pre-authentication data: name and realm or x509 certificate;
- local or protocol policy problem (TBD: level of details);
- KDC status message;
- On success:
- end-service or referral TGT ticket ID.
S4U2proxy
- entry-point-server's TGT ticket ID - primary ticket ID;
- request ID;
- user's evidence ticket - additional ticket in the request;
- On error:
- local or protocol policy problem (TBD: level of details);
- KDC status message;
- On success:
- end-service or referral TGT ticket ID.
Other events
(future development)
- Policy
- Policies violation when processing requests (AS, TGS, S4U etc);
- Secrets (Common Criteria FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4);
- long- and short-term keys creation, manipulation, cleaning.
Ticket details
- client and server principals;
- flags;
- start, end and renew_till times;
- authtime;
- authentication path - encoded list of transited realms for service ticket or referral TGT (for TGS only);
Design details
The following are highlights of this new feature:
Ticket ID
Ticket ID is recorded as part of audit messages. This allows to link tickets to their initial TGT at any stage of the Kerberos exchange.
For the purpose of this project we will create a private to KDC ticket ID: each successfully created ticket will be hashed and recorded into audit log. The administrators will correlate the primary and derived ticket IDs after the fact.
For the future, however, we need a more complex system that would allow to tie the tickets from a successful AS_REQ all the way to the application server. It is marked as an action item in this section.
Request ID
Request ID - hash of the request is recorded as part of audit messages. Using this piece of information an administrator can easily correlate multiple audit events related to a single request.
Hybrid
The proposal is a hybrid of variadic key-type-value triplet (KTV) and one-API-per-event approaches.
On the KDC side call audit event-specific functions, whose input consists of the event-id, event-status and event-specific structure. If event-specific callback is implemented by the audit plugin, strip the event-specific structure from the security sensitive information and then pass the pointer to the event-specific structure to the plugin. Otherwise, fallback to the generic function with variadic KTV arguments. In the latter case all non-string values should be converted into the strings and the key-types serve as a hint to the plugin implementor about the "original" type of the key-value.
KDC facing API
/* Audit plugin loaded/unloaded */ krb5_error_code load_audit_plugin(krb5_context context); krb5_error_code unload_audit_plugin(krb5_context context); /* event specific functions */ krb5_error_code kau_kdc_start(krb5_context context, struct server_handle shdl, int status); krb5_error_code kau_kdc_stop(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code status); krb5_error_code kau_as_req(krb5_context context, struct as_req_state *state, int status); krb5_error_code kau_tgs(krb5_context context, struct tgs_req_audit_state *state, int status);
Pluggable interface
/* Audit plugin vtable */ typedef struct krb5_audit_vtable_st { /* Mandatory: name of module. */ char *name; kau_open_fn open; kau_close_fn close; kau_generic_fn generic; kau_kdc_start_fn kdc_start; kau_kdc_stop_fn kdc_stop; kau_as_req_fn as_req; kau_tgs_req_fn tgs_req; } *krb5_audit_vtable; typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_open_fn)(kau_ctx *au_ctx); typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_close_fn)(kau_ctx au_ctx); /* general purpose interface to pass unspecified number of * key-type-value triplets to a plugable interface. */ typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_generic_fn)(kau_ctx au_ctx, const int event_id, const int status, ... ); /* one-API-per-event surrogate */ typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_kdc_start_fn)(kau_ctx au_ctx, const int event_id, const int status, struct server_handle_san shdl); typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_kdc_stop_fn)(kau_ctx au_ctx, const int event_id, const int status); typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_as_req_fn)(kau_ctx au_ctx, const int event_id, const int status, struct as_req_state_san *state); typedef krb5_error_code (*kau_tgs_fn)(kau_ctx au_ctx, const int event_id, const int status, struct tgs_req_state_san *state);
where new types server_handle_san, as_req_state_san and tgs_req_state_san are sanitized variants of server_handle, as_req_state and tgs_req_state structures respectively.
Example
krb5_error_code kau_as_req(krb5_context context, struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code status) { krb5_error_code rc = 0; ... /* If audit plugin event-specific callback is implemented, call it */ if (hdl->vt.as_req) { rc = hdl->vt.as_req(hdl->au_ctx, event_id, event_status, state); return rc; } /* Otherwise, try the generic one. */ if (hdl->vt.generic) rc = rec_as_req(hdl->au_ctx, event_id, event_status, state); return rc; } static krb5_error_code rec_as_req(krb5_context context, struct as_req_state_san *state, krb5_error_code status) { krb5_error_code rc = 0; ... /* All values with TYPE_NUM type-hint are string representations of * their numeric conterparts in 'state' structure. */ hdl->vt.record(hdl->au_ctx, event_id, event_status, "tkt_id", TYPE_NUM, tkt_id, // state->tkt_id "kdc_status", TYPE_STR, state->status, "full_address", TYPE_STR, state->full_address, /* request */ "req.client", TYPE_STR, state->req_client, "req.server", TYPE_STR, state->req_server, "req.kdc_options", TYPE_STR, state->req_kdc_options, "req.start", TYPE_NUM, req_from, // state->req_from "req.end", TYPE_NUM, req_end, // state->req_end "req.renew_till", TYPE_NUM, req_time, // state->req_rtime /* reply */ "rep.tkt.server", TYPE_STR, state->rep_tkt_server, "rep.tkt.flags", TYPE_NUM, rep_tkt_flags, // state->rep_tkt_flags "rep.tkt.start", TYPE_NUM, rep_tarttime, // state->rep_tarttime "rep.tkt.end", TYPE_NUM, rep_endtime, // pstate->rep_endtime, "rep.tkt.renew_till", TYPE_NUM, rep_renew_till, // state->rep_renew_till "rep.tkt.authtime", TYPE_NUM, rep_authtime, // state->rep_authtime, "rep.tkt.key_etype", TYPE_NUM, rep_session_enctype, // state->rep_session_enctype ); return rc; }
Dictionary
The possible basic field names are:
Key | Type | Comments |
---|---|---|
tkt_id_in | STR | primary (TGT) ticket ID |
tkt_id_out | STR | derived (service or referral TGT) ticket ID |
client | STR | client’s principal |
service | STR | requested service principal |
kdc_status | TR | KDC status (“ISSUE” on success) |
fromaddr | STR | client’s address |
fromport | NUM | client’s port |
full_address | STR | Alternative to "fromport"/"fromaddr" |
sess_etype | NUM | enctype of session key |
rep_etype | NUM | enctype of reply-encrypting key |
srv_etype | NUM | enctype of long-term key of the service key |
tkt_renewed | BOOL | was ticket renewed |
tkt_validated | BOOL | was ticket validated |
req.addresses | STR | requested addresses |
req.avail_etypes | STR | requested/available enc types |
req.kdc_options | NUM | KDC options (forwardable, allow_postdate etc) |
req.pa_type | STR | preauth types |
req.tkt_start | NUM | requested ticket start time |
req.tkt_end | NUM | requested ticket end time |
req.tkt_renew_till | NUM | requested ticket renew-till time |
req.tkt_authtime | NUM | requested ticket authtime |
req.sectkt_cname | STR | client principal in the second ticket (U2U etc) |
req.sectkt_sname | STR | service principal in the second ticket |
req.sectkt_flags | NUM | second ticket flags |
req.sectkt_start | NUM | second ticket start time |
req.sectkt_end | NUM | second ticket end time |
req.sectkt_authtime | NUM | second ticket authtime |
req.sectkt_etype | NUM | second ticket key type |
req.sname | STR | requested service principal |
req.cname | STR | client's principal |
rep.sname | STR | service principal in ticket |
rep.cname | STR | client principal in ticket |
rep.pa_type | STR | reply preauth types |
rep.rep_flags | NUM | ticket flags |
rep.rep_authtime | NUM | ticket authtime |
rep.tkt_start | NUM | ticket start time |
rep.tkt_end | NUM | ticket end time |
rep.tkt_renew_till | NUM | ticket renewed-till time |
rep.tr_contents | STR | ticket transited-realms list |
Configuration
The following ./configure option to be added:
- --with-audit-plugin=simple
- (For demo and testing purposes) Build the audit plugin "simple" and enable audit plugin.
Future work
- Standardize a Ticket_ID;
- Make reporting auditable events configurable. For example, one can choose to report TGS_REQ, but not AS_REQ etc;
- Define and make configurable the DETAILED and BASIC levels of the events;
- Develop Audit system for Preauth and Authdata mechanisms.
Test implementation
We will use libaudit module available on Fedora, Debian, Suse for the first round.
Some "simple" audit plugin will be implemented and Python test system will become aware of its existence. New ./configure --with-audit-plugin option will be introduced to build "simple" audit plugin for testing purpose. If audit is enabled and audit plugin is available, "make check" will store audit messages into audit log file.
References
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R4.pdf
- Oracle Solaris Auditing http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19963-01/html/821-1456/auditov-1.html
- Understanding Linux Audit http://doc.opensuse.org/products/draft/SLES/SLES-security_sd_draft/cha.audit.comp.html
- Advanced Security Audit Policy Settings http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd772712(v=ws.10).aspx
- Events Classification in Log Audit http://airccse.org/journal/nsa/0410ijnsa5.pdf
- CEE Log Syntax (CLS) Encoding http://cee.mitre.org/language/1.0-beta1/cls.html