Difference between revisions of "User:TomYu/PKINIT notes"
(New page: == Diffie-Hellman == * Oakley MODP groups (used in PKINIT) have safe primes as moduli ** These primes don't satisfy the OpenSSL DH_check() tests, so there can be some confusion when debug...) |
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== Diffie-Hellman == |
== Diffie-Hellman == |
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| − | * Oakley MODP groups (used in PKINIT) have safe primes as moduli |
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| + | PKINIT uses the well-known IKE (Oakley) MODP group 2 ({{rfcref|2409}}, {{rfcref|2412}}), along with IKE MODP groups 14, and 16 ({{rfcref|3526}}) when doing Diffie-Hellman key agreement. These groups are modulo safe primes, i.e., ''p'' = 2''q'' + 1. They use 2 as a generator, and the primes are chosen so that 2 generates the subgroup of order ''q'', to prevent the leaking of the least significant bit of the private exponent ''x'' via the [[wp:Legendre symbol|Legendre symbol]] of the public key ''g''<sup>''x''</sup>. |
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| − | ** These primes don't satisfy the OpenSSL DH_check() tests, so there can be some confusion when debugging |
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| − | ** The generator generates the subgroup of order ''q'' instead of the whole group. (OpenSSL wants it to generate the whole group -- the test is ''p'' = 11 mod 24, which includes the test ''p'' = 3 mod 8, which is false if 2 is a quadratic residue mod ''p''.) |
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| + | === D-H number theory === |
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| + | A safe prime is of the form ''p'' = 2''q'' + 1, where ''q'' is prime. To be cryptographically useful, ''p'' is a large (odd) prime, therefore ''p'' ≡ 1 (mod 2). Also, ''p'' ≡ 2 (mod 3), as is ''q'', because either ''p'' or ''q'' being congruent to 1 (mod 3) implies that the other is divisible by 3. (This is only true if ''q'' ≠ 3, which is true for cryptographically useful primes.) By the [[wp:Chinese remainder theorem|Chinese remainder theorem]], this means ''p'' ≡ 5 (mod 6). 2 generates the subgroup of size ''q'' if 2 is a quadratic residue mod ''p''. According to the law of [[wp:Quadratic reciprocity|quadratic reciprocity]], for 2 to be a quadratic residue mod ''p'', ''p'' ≡ ±1 (mod 8). If ''p'' is a safe prime, it can't be 1 (mod 8) because that would mean that ''q'' is not prime. |
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| + | === OpenSSL issues === |
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| + | The OpenSSL DH_check() tests could fail on the IKE MODP groups, because DH_check() applies the test ''p'' ≡ 11 (mod 24) for a generator of 2. The prime consequently has to also satisfy the congruences ''p'' ≡ 2 (mod 3) and ''p'' ≡ 3 (mod 8). The congruence ''p'' ≡ ±3 (mod 8) is true if 2 is not a quadratic residue mod ''p'', which means that DH_check() is checking that 2 will generate the entire group modulo ''p''. (''p'' ≡ 5 (mod 8) implies ''q'' is an even number.) The code in DH_check() in newer versions of OpenSSL does additional checks if the ''q'' parameter is given, which include ''g''<sup>''q''</sup> ≡ 1 (mod ''p'') (''g'' generates the subgroup of order ''q'' if ''q'' is prime), ''p'' ≡ 1 (mod ''q'') (''q'' divides ''p'' - 1), and that ''q'' is prime. These checks on the ''q'' parameter supersede the check that the generator would generate the entire group mod ''p''. |
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| + | === Windows 7 interop === |
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* Windows 7 clients omit the ''q'' value in DomainParameters when sending PA-PK-AS-REQ {{bug|7596}} |
* Windows 7 clients omit the ''q'' value in DomainParameters when sending PA-PK-AS-REQ {{bug|7596}} |
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Latest revision as of 22:58, 11 April 2013
Diffie-Hellman
PKINIT uses the well-known IKE (Oakley) MODP group 2 (RFC 2409, RFC 2412), along with IKE MODP groups 14, and 16 (RFC 3526) when doing Diffie-Hellman key agreement. These groups are modulo safe primes, i.e., p = 2q + 1. They use 2 as a generator, and the primes are chosen so that 2 generates the subgroup of order q, to prevent the leaking of the least significant bit of the private exponent x via the Legendre symbol of the public key gx.
D-H number theory
A safe prime is of the form p = 2q + 1, where q is prime. To be cryptographically useful, p is a large (odd) prime, therefore p ≡ 1 (mod 2). Also, p ≡ 2 (mod 3), as is q, because either p or q being congruent to 1 (mod 3) implies that the other is divisible by 3. (This is only true if q ≠ 3, which is true for cryptographically useful primes.) By the Chinese remainder theorem, this means p ≡ 5 (mod 6). 2 generates the subgroup of size q if 2 is a quadratic residue mod p. According to the law of quadratic reciprocity, for 2 to be a quadratic residue mod p, p ≡ ±1 (mod 8). If p is a safe prime, it can't be 1 (mod 8) because that would mean that q is not prime.
OpenSSL issues
The OpenSSL DH_check() tests could fail on the IKE MODP groups, because DH_check() applies the test p ≡ 11 (mod 24) for a generator of 2. The prime consequently has to also satisfy the congruences p ≡ 2 (mod 3) and p ≡ 3 (mod 8). The congruence p ≡ ±3 (mod 8) is true if 2 is not a quadratic residue mod p, which means that DH_check() is checking that 2 will generate the entire group modulo p. (p ≡ 5 (mod 8) implies q is an even number.) The code in DH_check() in newer versions of OpenSSL does additional checks if the q parameter is given, which include gq ≡ 1 (mod p) (g generates the subgroup of order q if q is prime), p ≡ 1 (mod q) (q divides p - 1), and that q is prime. These checks on the q parameter supersede the check that the generator would generate the entire group mod p.
Windows 7 interop
- Windows 7 clients omit the q value in DomainParameters when sending PA-PK-AS-REQ [krbdev.mit.edu #7596]
- Even after allowing the omission of the q value, Windows 7 doesn't seem to deal with Diffie-Hellman group negotiation. (The KDC has to accept the 1024-bit modulus, because the counterproposal of the 2048-bit modulus fails on the client somehow.)
